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The ‘European Social Model’ under Pressure 
The Effects of European Austerity Programmes on Social Security Systems
1 
Arne Heise and Hanna Lierse 
1. Social Policy in the Process of European Unification 
It is an open secret that the welfare state has become a basket case and must therefore be re-
formed or at  least  reconstructed and modernised. Globalisation and European integration, 
demographic  change  and  individualisation  processes  in  society  have,  slowly  but  surely, 
eroded the welfare state foundations of EU member states. If the renovation work does not 
start soon, according to the conventional wisdom, the welfare state will collapse under the 
weight of its costs and the burden of redistribution. What has been the mainstream perspective 
on social policy in economics as well as in politics over the past two decades, may become 
another TINA (there is no alternative) imperative in the aftermath of the recent world finan-
cial crisis and the ensuing „absurd austerity policies‟ (Arestis/Pelagidis 2010) almost every-
where in Europe.  
Before we turn to the development trends of European welfare states – the »European Social 
Model« – in particular under conditions of the general need for consolidation in the face of 
soaring public debt due to the recent global financial crisis in six European countries (part 2), 
first a few taxonomical remarks (part 1) will be made. After a comparison of the austerity 
programmes (part 3) a short conclusion (part 4) tries to take up the lines of discussion ad-
dressed in the first part.  
1.1 Social State or Welfare State? 
In general usage, but also in the social science literature, the terms »social state« (»Sozial-
staat«) and »welfare state« (»Wohlfahrtsstaat«) are virtually synonymous. By contrast, we 
shall use the term »welfare state« only when state intervention involves, not just social ad-
justment or social protection but broader social and economic policy change to increase socie-
tal welfare. »Social policy« in the strict sense is to be reserved for protection against the five 
                                                 
1 This is the shortened and revised version of a study prepared for the Friedrich Ebert Foundation.  
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basic life risks – old age, illness, unemployment, accident and poverty – and »social state« re-
fers to this core. Welfare state policy, by contrast, requires, besides the instruments of »social 
policy« in the strict sense, collectively determined and democratically legitimised objectives 
(for example, the degree of redistribution, possible limits to be imposed on the market or a 
willingness to pursue »decommodification«) and a broad-based embedding of social policy, 
ranging from macroeconomic control through family policy to education policy as the basis of 
participation and inclusion which is not exclusively market-oriented. 
Within the framework of this distinction we shall be concerned here only with the social state 
in the EU – and the European Social Model will refer precisely to that – not the welfare state 
in the broader sense. This is owing, on the one hand, to a necessary limitation of the object of 
investigation, while at the same time reflecting the abovementioned change of perspective 
with regard to the allocation of »social policy« tasks after the end of the »Keynesian welfare 
state«. Three objective processes 
•  globalisation/European integration 
•  individualisation 
•  population ageing  
have led, against the background of the neoliberalism which has dominated for the past three 
decades, to social policy being understood almost exclusively in supply-side terms as a distor-
tion of allocation due to adverse incentives. In this view, the collective redistributive content 
of social policy – justifiable in demand-side terms –needed to be scaled back in favour of 
greater individual equivalence and, where possible, provided privately so that both in supply-
side terms and as regards competitiveness the greatest possible efficiency and financial sus-
tainability (economisation) would be ensured.  
It will also be demonstrated by means of the distinction between welfare state and social state 
that the outcome of the »social policy modernisation efforts« will not be the end of the social 
state, but does involve a clear-cut change in its substantive arrangements, the balance between 
collective and individual contributions, funding and also benefit eligibility and legitimacy. In 
this sense the former contrast between Europe, with its developed welfare states, and the 
USA, with its limited social state, is brought out more clearly. And if one takes the develop-
ment outlined above into account, it is obvious why Alber (2006) no longer recognises any  
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systematic difference between Europe and the USA which would justify a special emphasis 
on a »European Social Model«.  
1.2 Different Models of the Social State in the EU, or: Is There a European Social 
Model? 
European social states have not only developed fairly disparately in historical terms, but they 
also correspond to the variety of European economic models (cf. Strünck 2008). This relates 
to the extent of the provision of social security, the level of decommodification, the manner of 
funding, the structural allocation of social security needs in terms of the various exigencies 
and their institutionalisation. According to the well-known categorisation by Esping-Andersen 
(1990) we can therefore distinguish between at least three types of social state in the EU: 
(i)   the social democratic or Scandinavian type 
(ii)  the social conservative or continental type 
(iii)  the liberal or Anglo-Saxon type 
With eastern enlargement this variety is likely to have increased (see Busch 2005: 24): for the 
time being, therefore, one cannot talk of one or the European Social Model. To be sure, the 
abovementioned transformation and modernisation process of the various social states in the 
EU may converge into a common model; on the other hand, the »European Social Model« can 
also serve as an ideal model for a (new?) mode of integration capable of distinguishing itself 
more clearly again from the US model. 
1.3 European Integration as Engine of Convergence? 
The literature on the future development of the social state in the EU is voluminous and in-
conclusive. Although the abovementioned objective factors and, in particular, the require-
ments of European integration affect all member states, national adaptation paths can vary 
considerably: on the one hand, one may agree with Sapir et al. (2003) who, against the back-
ground of neoliberal ideologising and the EU integration architecture, take the view that only 
the liberal model is capable of surviving and, therefore, predict a corresponding convergence; 
on the other hand, however, one might share Strünck‟s (2008) assessment that not only is the 
social state model shaped by the underlying economic model, but also the relevant modernisa-
tion and adaptation paths are fitted to the economic model and, consequently, divergences  
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will remain and, at best, over the long term various hybrid models will emerge. To some ex-
tent between these positions lies Busch (2005; 2009) who claims to recognise a convergence 
towards a hybrid model in the system of competitive market states – which is the result of the 
EU‟s neoliberal architecture (see also Streeck 1996) – which takes account of the fact that so-
cial systems have become significant factors in competitiveness, in particular in the single 
currency area (that is, EMU). Within the framework of the method of open coordination – the 
soft form of governance which characterises EU social policy – forms of recommodification, 
privatisation and cuts in social security may be discerned practically everywhere.  
There is no room here to go into detail concerning the individual structural features of the pu-
tative convergence process. Ultimately, however, »economisation« is tied up with a scaling 
back of the level of social security with a view to reducing alleged problems of allocation and 
competitiveness. If one looks at the relative social spending of various countries representing 
different models (Figure 1), however, a general downward spiral of levels of social security is 
not apparent.
2  
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Source: OECD, Country statistical profiles 2009. 
 
Some member states, regardless of their social security model (France as an example of the 
continental model, Denmark as an example of the Scandinavian model and Poland as repr e-
sentative of the CEE countries), even register increasing social spending rates and only in a 
few countries – for example, Ireland as representative of the liberal model, Slovakia as repre-
sentative of the CEE states and Sweden as representative of the Scandinavian model – is there 
                                                 
2 Certainly, it should not be overlooked that a constant rate of social spending does not necessarily mean a con-
stant level of social security if the number of benefit recipients increases due to population ageing, rising poverty 
or unemployment.  
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a falling trend with regard to social spending rates, and in all cases in terms of a more up-to-
date time horizon stagnation can be discerned rather than a clear (downward) trend.  
If, therefore, convergence towards a generalisable »European Social Model« is to be linked to 
serious endangerment of social achievements in the EU other evidence has to be produced. In 
Figures 2a and 2b, therefore, not only the development of social spending rates is taken into 
account but also the state of development of the national economy (GDP per capita). Social 
security, after all, is a public good demand for which on the part of consumers (citizens) in-
creases with rising incomes (positive income elasticity).  
Figure 2a: Correlation between Social Spending and Per Capita Income (1980 and 1990)  
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Figure 2b: Correlation between Social Spending and Per Capita Income (2000 and 2005)  




























































































Note: The following countries were selected: Germany, France, Netherlands, Denmark, Italy, 
Greece, Spain, Belgium, Sweden, Austria, Ireland, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Poland.  
Source: OECD, Country statistical profiles 2009. 
 
It would be evidence of dumping not only if social benefit rates are falling in absolute terms 
but also if these rates do not correspond to economic development, as long as a positive corre-
lation can be determined between the two. Figures 2a and 2b identify this correlation at vari-
ous time points: with regard to 1980 and 1990 we can talk of a high and even increasing cor-
relation coefficient (R-square), regardless of variations in terms of social state models. The 
level of the rate of social spending is explained, on this basis, by the state of economic devel- 
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opment (57 per cent and 71 per cent, respectively): the increase in the correlation coefficient 
can be understood primarily as a result of the fact that Greece implemented an above-average 
increase in social spending after EU accession and sought to adapt to Europe‟s (material) de-
velopment path. The picture changes, however, when we look at 2000 and 2005: now the 
close correlation is largely dissolved – only around 16–17 per cent of social spending can be 
explained on the basis of the state of development of member states‟ economies. Responsible 
for this is at least relative dumping in countries of the liberal (Ireland) and CEE (Slovakia) 
type which did not develop their social states in accordance with their growing economies, 
but countries of the continental type (the Netherlands), too, contributed – by scaling back their 
social states – to making social policy in the EU increasingly a location and competitiveness 
factor.  
1.4 The European Social Model under Pressure 
The developments in social states depend on a variety of real political power constellations; 
they do not depend on economic-functional or ideological considerations alone. Despite nu-
merous objective and subjective negative factors the European modernisation process is not 
simply a matter of a race to the bottom with regard to social standards. On the other hand, the 
data suggest that the material development path discernible in the 1980s and 1990s is being 
abandoned or at least will no longer shape the frame of reference. The bigger the objective 
negative factors and the change of perspective with regard to the welfare state in the direction 
of »economisation« the sooner a corresponding development is to be expected. To that extent 
it is important whether the »European Social Model« – in particular after the sobering experi-
ences of European political actors with the at least sceptical, if not hostile attitude of EU citi-
zens, which also manifested itself in the failed attempt to obtain agreement on a European 
Constitution – is developed as a positive vision of a social or welfare state which differs from 
the US model.  
The strategy of former Commission President Jacques Delors consisted precisely of this at-
tempt to reduce the »social deficit« (Joerges/Rödl 2004) by paying closer attention to the so-
cial component. Delors is associated not only with further economic integration within the 
framework of the single market and monetary union, but also with the shaping of the »Euro-
pean Social Model«. Delors was convinced that market creating integration measures alone 
would not be sufficient to overcome the Euro-scepticism of the 1980s (»Eurosclerosis«); in  
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particular,  the  increasing  incongruence  of  the  reach  of  the  market  and  market  regulation 
threatened  to  put  national  social  standards  under  pressure  revealing  the  limits  of  »semi-
sovereign nation states« (see Leibfried/Pierson 1995). For the socialist Delors, therefore, eco-
nomic and social integration still presupposed one another and his vision of the »European 
Social Model« may still be regarded as a serious attempt to defend Europe‟s welfare state tra-
ditions and to understand it as a source of legitimation for European integration. Later Euro-
pean Commissions, therefore, must be regarded as important motors of the change of perspec-
tive (see, for example, Aust 2004; Hofbauer 2007). In this way those forces in the European 
Commission have won through »in the struggle over European integration« (Hooghe/Marks 
1999) which in the Delors Commission were still kept in check by the white paper »Growth, 
Competitiveness and Employment« (European Commission 1993), sometimes described as 
»neo-Keynesian« (Schmid 1995: 258). This occurred, astonishingly, at a time when a window 
of opportunity was opened up by the coming to power in many – and indeed the most impor-
tant – EU member states of Social Democratic governments for establishing or restoring a 
genuinely »Euro-Keynesian« development path. The major discord which arose in the Ger-
man SPD during the first Schröder government with Oskar Lafontaine‟s resignation from all 
Party and government posts and the ultimate victory of »left-wing supply side politician« 
(Priddat 2001) exemplifies the uncertainty about the future economic and social policy course 
of European social democracy (see Aust 2004) and explains why this window of opportunity 
soon closed again. It also explains why the European Commission found it easy to assert its 
ideas  on  the  »social  investment  state«  and  the  human  capital-oriented  and  incentive-
compatible notion of employability in place of the quantitative (level of) employment as the 
connotative basis of the »European Social Model«, as well as the employment policy incorpo-
rated in the Amsterdam Treaty as further source of legitimation. For Hofbauer (2007) the 
Commission has taken advantage of ideas which the general public view positively – such as 
the European Social Model and employment policy – to enhance the legitimacy and accep-
tance principally of economic integration, hiding and reinterpreting the »economisation« of 
the social behind the apparently familiar.  
Whether the recent world financial crisis will lead once again to the kind of »violent social 
conflicts through which emancipatory forces will set the agenda and the currently dominant 
projects will be rejected« (Brand 2006: 169 own translation) remains to be seen. Besides the 
temporary loss of legitimacy of orthodox neoliberal economic and financial ideas at the ideo- 
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logical level (Heise 2009), at the level of political practice the global financial crisis has, for 
the time being, imposed an enormous strain on public-sector budgets.  
Almost in parallel in 2009 the whole of Europe entered a deep depression of a magnitude – 
and extent – not seen since the world economic crisis at the beginning of the 1930s. Different 
from the 1930s, however, has been the level-headed reaction of governments and the positive 
effects of social security: by means of discretionary economic stimulus packages, far-reaching 
financial  market  stabilisation  programmes  and  socially  responsive  »automatic  stabilisers«, 
further destabilisation of the real economy and the complete collapse of the international fi-
nancial markets have been prevented – although with significant consequences for state budg-
ets. Structural new borrowing everywhere has exceeded the level of the balanced budget fore-
seen by the Stability and Growth Pact and the »automatic stabilisers« are everywhere adding 
several percentage points to this. Germany, although affected slightly more than average by 
the financial crisis, is experiencing only mild upheavals. This shows the two faces of Ger-
many‟s strong export orientation: the major economic downturn has been countered less by 
discretionary measures (see Heise 2010a) than by trust in the competitiveness of the German 
economy in the surprisingly strong upswing of, in particular, some emerging countries in 
2010. Other countries – especially Greece, Spain and the UK – have relied more on their own 
economic stabilisation measures or need more financial resources to stabilise the banks.  
Everywhere, public debt is rising sharply, thereby cancelling out a decade of – albeit modest – 
consolidation. This demonstrates the level of consolidation needed if the debt limit of 60 per 
cent of GDP laid down in the Stability and Growth Pact is to be maintained as the measure of 
sustainable finance policy: only the new accession states, which started out from very low 
levels of debt in the wake of their social and economic transformations, will manage to keep 
below the threshold in 2010. But even on the basis of this fact it cannot be called into question 
that the structural deficits in relation to economic growth must be cut considerably if a per-
manent increase in public debt is to be prevented. The perennially sensitive issue for finance 
policy is whether this is to be achieved through tax rises or tax cuts, or through cuts or in-
creases in (social) consumption or investment. The conventional view that cuts in (in particu-
lar social) consumption are to be preferred to tax increases is controversial, to say the least 
(see Heise 2004).   
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2. Budget Consolidation in Selected European Countries 
Having concerned ourselves in the previous section with a theoretical reflection on the classi-
fication and development of social security systems in European countries, in this section we 
shall take a detailed look at the effects and changes which accompanied the recent economic 
crisis.  
In 2009, the member states commenced a fiscal policy »exit strategy« in order to reduce the 
public borrowing which had increased enormously since the outbreak of the economic crisis. 
This exit strategy is supposed to continue beyond the scaling back of economic stimulus 
packages and to be supported by means of further savings and structural reforms. While the 
European Commission suggests that consolidation measures be implemented at the latest in 
2011 most states adopted far-reaching cuts and reforms in 2010 and some began the consoli-
dation process as early as 2009.  
While no EU member state has been spared the need to take consolidation measures, the ex-
tent and nature of the measures involved and their effects on social security systems have not 
yet been examined systematically and comparatively. The analysis which follows constitutes 
a contribution to that and an attempt to discover whether and how member states‟ social secu-
rity systems have been affected by the cuts and the structural reforms. We shall also evaluate 
whether the crisis has functioned as a motor of social policy convergence among the member 
states. Building on the previous theoretical discussion of the development of social security 
systems in Europe we shall assume that there are both similarities between countries and 
types of system and specifically national, path-dependent developments with regard to social 
security systems. In particular, it is assumed that the crisis has triggered further convergence 
towards a »social investment« system which is largely undoing the decommodification of so-
cial policy.  
In what follows we shall examine in some detail the consolidation programmes of six Euro-
pean countries and their effects on social security systems. In the foreground are a number of 
states which were particularly hard hit by the crisis and which also reflect the plurality of 
types of social state in Europe. While Germany represents the continental type, the UK repre-
sents the liberal model, Greece and Spain the Southern European type, Romania the Central 
and East European type and Iceland can be assigned, in the broadest sense, to the social de-
mocratic model.  
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2.1  Cornerstones of the German Austerity Programme 
With its Financial Plan up to 2014 and the Federal Budget 2011 the Merkel government laid 
down the basic pillars of German consolidation policy: by 2014, 80 billion euros are to be 
saved, representing an annual 0.8 per cent of GDP. In this way by 2013 the deficit limit of the 
Stability and Growth Pact is to be maintained and by 2016 the structural deficit is to be 
brought down to 0.35 per cent of GDP, as prescribed by the new debt regulation in the Consti-
tution. The focus of the German austerity package is spending, the idea being to make a start 
»where savings and higher revenues are possible without endangering the growth potential of 
the economy and the social balance« (Federal Ministry of Finance 2010a). Nevertheless, the 
German government also plans substantial cuts in the social budget, making up more than 30 
per cent of the whole consolidation programme. This is because sustainable budgetary re-
structuring  can  succeed  only  »if  this  sector  also  makes  a  targeted  and  fair  contribution« 
(Bundesregierung online 2010a).  
The conservative-liberal government plans, besides cuts in parental benefits for recipients of 
so-called »unemployment benefit II« (which consists of the former unemployment benefit and 
transfers from the social welfare system), to transform statutory benefits into discretionary 
benefits and to abolish subsidies for heating and the state pension contribution for this group. 
At present, persons receiving unemployment benefit II for a year receive an additional pen-
sion entitlement of 2.2 euros a month. Since this sum is insufficient to obtain an adequate 
pension, according to the government, the coalition is now abolishing it completely. Besides 
these measures, which affect the most needy, the government plans cuts in parental benefits 
and structural changes in health care policy. Even in the latter two areas, in which it would be 
possible to incorporate an element of progressive redistribution, the government‟s consolida-
tion policy is affecting those on the lowest incomes. 
Unlike in most European countries the government in Germany does not adjust old age pen-
sions. However, in previous years the pension level fell due to a number of reforms and the 
role of private and company pensions increased (see Hegelich/Meyer 2008). Furthermore, the 
consolidation measures also concerned the health care system (Federal Ministry of Finance 
2010b):  besides  drug  companies,  doctors  and  hospitals,  in  particular  those  with  statutory 
health insurance have to bear the cost of rising health care spending. Under the health care re-
form of 2011 health insurance companies can levy an additional contribution from members  
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with  the  professed  aim  of  »promoting  transparency  and  competition«  (Bundesregierung 
online 2010b). However, the contribution is not income-related and can be regarded as an in-
crease in the flat-rate premium. Given the regressive effects of flat-rate premiums low in-
comes are comparatively harder hit despite the solidarity surcharge (Blank/Leiber 2010). The 
reform also abolishes parity of contributions between employers and employees, hitherto a 
basic principle of German health insurance.  
The German government‟s budget consolidation programme and the social state reforms are 
relatively low in terms of GDP in comparison to those of other European countries (see also 
Table 1). This is certainly because of Germany‟s favourable current economic and thus also 
budgetary  development.  Despite  the  relatively  low  level  of  restructuring  the  reforms  are 
clearly directed towards social policy: the measures have affected the neediest in society – 
safeguarding or reinforcing social benefits for the unemployed and low earners does not come 
into it. On the contrary, all »additional« emoluments have been cut in order to boost incen-
tives to get a job and personal responsibility, according to the government. The basic idea of 
»social balance«, as advanced by the conservative-liberal coalition, can thus be understood 
not in terms of social inclusion and ensuring incomes, but rather as a turning away from high 
social benefits and towards individual responsibility and private provision.  
2.2  The Spanish Austerity Programme  
With the budget plan for 2010 the Spanish consolidation process commenced with the aim of 
reducing the deficit to three per cent of GDP by 2013 (Stability Programme ES 2010). How-
ever, on top of this package the government ratcheted up its economy drive in the course of 
the year: besides the austerity plan (2011–2013) and the Action Plan (2010) considerable 
spending cuts were earmarked for the public sector, and the government passed laws on struc-
tural reform in the pension system and the labour market, as well as additional economies to-
talling 15 billion euros (Ley decreto mdedidias adicionales 2010). These extensive reforms 
are supposed to tighten the Spanish budget while boosting economic growth and ensuring ba-
sic social care. The Spanish strategy is thus concentrating on a mixture of spending cuts and 
revenue increases (Stability Programme ES 2010, see also Table 1).  
With its first consolidation wave, the 2010 budget plan, the government decided to reduce the 
deficit by 2.1 per cent of GDP, whereby no significant cuts in social services were envisaged. 
The government increased VAT, tax on interest and some consumption taxes. In addition, in- 
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centives were laid down to stabilise jobs, within the framework of which corporate tax was to 
be reduced from 25 per cent to 20 per cent for SMEs which maintain or increase their em-
ployment rate. On the spending side, the government planned a public sector pay and pension 
freeze. Substantial reforms and cuts in the Spanish social state were not foreseen. However, 
the social democratic government implemented additional austerity measures which envisage 
cuts in the pension system and other areas of social policy.  
Within the framework of the »Strategy for a sustainable economy and budget position« the 
Spanish government implemented a number of structural reforms in relation to pension and 
labour market policy (Stability Programme ES  2010). The latter is supposed to introduce 
more flexibility into wage negotiations and employment protection, but at the same time to re-
inforce the employment rights of those on temporary contracts (Labour Market Act Spain 
2010). The aim is to stabilise the employment situation in Spain, where the main problem is 
the large proportion of temporary and provisional jobs, accounting for around 30 per cent of 
all employment contracts, well over the European average of 14 per cent (Eurostat 2010a). 
The lack of employment policy stabilisers undoubtedly also explains the sharp increase in the 
unemployment rate since the beginning of the economic crisis. The belief that more flexibili-
sation will contribute to stabilisation may be explained historically: since the end of Fran-
coism neoliberal approaches have had considerable weight in Spain (Lessenich 1997).  
The  Toledo  Pact  of  2010,  which  envisages  extensive  pension  reform  and  is  supposed  to 
achieve cuts to the value of four per cent of GDP by 2030 (El Mundo 2010), is also part of the 
strategy for a sustainable economy and budget position. Pension reform includes measures in 
accordance with the OECD trend (Hinrichs 2008): a uniform pension system has been estab-
lished, individual equivalence has been reinforced, the retirement age has been raised and the 
minimum contribution period has been increased from 15 to 25 years. Furthermore, part-time 
work for those approaching retirement has been temporarily abolished and the 2011 pension 
increase suspended, although the social security pension is exempt from the latter two meas-
ures (Additional Measures Act 2010). The aim of the reforms is to create incentives for regu-
lar  and  longer  payment  of  pension  insurance  contributions.  However,  in  particular  the 
strengthening of individual equivalence, which is supposed to connect pension levels more 
closely to contributions, leads to pension redistribution: those with low incomes and erratic 
employment will increasingly receive lower benefits than those with stable and high incomes.  
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In Spain, where the unemployment rate is currently 20 per cent and the number of temporary 
contracts is high, this reform can be expected to exacerbate income inequality in old age.  
The government also plans to abolish the so-called »baby cheque« and to reduce costs in the 
health care sector. The baby cheque was introduced by the social democratic government in 
2007 and entitles parents to a one-off payment of at least 2,500 euros on the birth of a child. 
From 2011 this non-income related support will be abolished. Health care reforms are aimed 
at reducing costs: the state system entitles every citizen to free health care. However, expendi-
ture on drugs is high in Spain and infrastructure is poor and out-of-date (Gil-Escoin/Vaszquez 
2008). The current reforms are aimed in particular at lowering drug costs: savings of 1.5 bil-
lion euros a year are to be achieved by reducing the price of generic medicines and introduc-
ing price caps. Although the social democratic government is not levying copayments, the 
state health care system will cover only drug costs which are in line with the new price regu-
lations.  
The social  policy  cuts  implemented by the Spanish  government  within the framework of 
budget consolidation are relatively moderate (see also Table 1) since no specific cuts in basic 
provisions for social insurance recipients are envisaged. However, the reforms must be re-
garded as predominantly liberal and regressive because the abolition of the baby cheque has 
hit low income families hardest. Pension reform, too, adversely affects in particular those with 
unstable and irregular work records. Taking into consideration the high unemployment and 
the instability on the Spanish labour market pension reform will result in significantly lower 
earnings for many people. In addition, the Zapatero government is not planning redistributive 
compensation by taxing higher incomes or property, so that budget consolidation will pre-
dominantly affect families and future pensioners on low and irregular incomes. In order to be 
able to contextualise the reforms within the framework of the overall development of social 
policy in Spain, in what follows the basic features of the Spanish social state will be examined 
in more detail.  
2.3  The Greek Austerity Package 
The social democratic government is banking on tough austerity measures which will not 
leave the Greek social security system unscathed. The 2010 Stability Programme was aimed 
at reducing the budget deficit within the year by between four and 8.7 per cent (Stability Pro-
gramme GR 2010a). When shortly afterwards at the beginning of 2010 the danger of state  
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bankruptcy reared its head and Greece signed an international rescue package (see above) the 
Papandreou government passed additional austerity measures in the amount of two per cent of 
GDP or 4.8 billion euros (Stability Programme GR 2010b). The government‟s consolidation 
strategy is comprehensive and includes both tax increases and social security cuts (see also 
Table 1). Although the latter are not the focus of the consolidation measures essential areas 
such as pension provisions, labour market policy and health care have been substantially af-
fected.  
Extensive pension reforms were presented to parliament because – thus ran the argument – 
only in this way would Greece be able to make its public finances sustainable. The costs of 
pension provisions have risen in recent years from 4.5 per cent of GDP in 2005 to 6.6 per cent 
of GDP in 2009. According to various prognoses unless the pension system is restructured 
spending will even exceed 24 per cent of GDP by 2060 (Stability Programme GR 2010a). 
Spending is significantly above the average for European member states which could point to 
preferential treatment for pension recipients with regard to social spending. However, the 
non-contribution related social pension, with a basic monthly benefit of 228 euros (2006), is 
very low and the system is strongly segmented, with major differences between benefit levels, 
retirement ages and the contribution system. Since the mid-1990s pension reform has been 
high on the reform agenda, but until the outbreak of the crisis there was little to show for it.  
In July 2010 Parliament assented to this extensive pension reform, which is designed to save 
three billion euros by 2012. A series of measures are supposed to help to rationalise pension 
spending and, at the same time, to provide employment incentives by boosting individual con-
tribution equivalence. For example, the retirement age for women and men has been raised to 
65 years of age, pension amounts have been adapted to GDP fluctuations, early retirement in-
centives have been abolished, the payment period for the minimum pension has been length-
ened and the contribution assessment base has been increased, so that it no longer relates 
solely to the final years‟ income. Privileges for particular groups have been abolished and the 
number of pension funds has been reduced. In addition, a wage freeze has been imposed for 
2010–2012, holiday bonuses have been reduced and those receiving pensions of over 1,400 
euros a month will in future pay extra income tax of up to 10 per cent. The pension reforms 
are generally in line with those of other OECD states, putting more emphasis on individual 
contribution equivalence, the »living income« principle and raising the retirement age (see 
Hinrichs 2008). From these reforms it may be expected that state pension benefits will in fu- 
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ture be lower and distributed much more unequally, although the 10 per cent tax on higher 
pensions will compensate this effect to some extent.  
The Greek health care system has also been hit by the austerity measures. A reduction in state 
funded drugs and the introduction of price and cost caps for hospitals are intended to save at 
least 300 million euros. In contrast to pensions, however, even before the crisis public spend-
ing on health care was below that of other EU member states (Stability Programme Greece 
2010a). In addition, the state system introduced in 1983, which is supposed to provide univer-
sal access and coverage with regard to health services, early on exhibited serious inefficien-
cies, funding deficits, corruption and discrimination (Davaki/Mosialos 2006). To what extent 
the planned reforms will rectify these problems remains unclear.  
In response to public budgetary difficulties the Greek government reformed the pension and 
health care systems and stepped up its existing activating labour market policy. The pension 
and health care reforms are designed to boost the incentives with regard to »normal« em-
ployment. Both the pension reform, which has reinforced individual contribution equivalence, 
and the employment policy orientation more strongly emphasise incentives, with not much of 
a role for redistribution and income stabilisation. However, the social democratic government 
shied away from explicit cuts in social benefits and imposed extra taxes on higher pensions, 
as well as one-off payments on high profit rates and expensive real estate. The social policy 
reforms fit in the paradigm of the social investment welfare state, which focuses less on redis-
tribution and income guarantees and more on incentives towards labour market participation. 
However, the Greek austerity programme and social policy cuts which have affected unem-
ployment benefit recipients and low earners appear to be relatively moderate (see also Section 
3, Table 1).  
2.4  Iceland’s Austerity Package 
In July 2009 the Left-Green government presented its budget consolidation package, which 
amounts to 179 billion krona or 12 per cent of GDP, covering a period of five years. This 
represents a significant moderation of the programme of the preceding conservative govern-
ment, which planned cuts amounting to 16 per cent of GDP (Iceland 2010). In the period 
2009–2013, 35 billion krona (around 1.17 billion euros) are to be saved annually, or 2.4 per 
cent of GDP. The measures are all-embracing and include both spending cuts and tax in-
creases,  aimed  at  achieving  a  positive  primary  balance  in  2011  and  positive  net  lend- 
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ing/borrowing in 2013 (Iceland 2009). Although the government takes the view that, given 
the continuing recession, tax increases would do less damage to economic growth, spending 
cuts account for the largest share of the consolidation package, at 64 per cent (Iceland 2010).  
On the revenue side, the Icelandic government has adopted extensive reforms. In July 2009, it 
increased social insurance contributions from 5.34 per cent to seven per cent, raised VAT by 
half a percentage point, increased a number of consumption taxes and the capital levy on 
yields of over 250,000 krona from 10 per cent to 15 per cent, and introduced a temporary 
supplementary tax on monthly incomes above 700,000 krona (around 4,600 euros) (IMF, 
2010a). An increase in corporation tax is also planned, which at present stands at only 18 per 
cent. These tax policy measures are progressive since the government, besides tax rises across 
the board, is making those on higher incomes pay more.  
On the expenditure side, too, the Left-Green government has tried to avoid imposing a dis-
proportionate burden and cuts in living standards on those on low incomes. Despite this ap-
proach, however, Iceland has not been spared social cuts: particularly hard hit have been old 
age and invalidity pensions, as well as health insurance and child benefit. Cuts in these areas 
are intended to reduce spending by around 10 billion krona before the end of 2010, although 
minimum payments are not affected but rather those benefitting from universal benefits de-
spite higher incomes.  
The current policy approach, which leaves low incomes untouched, represents a move away 
from previous social policy reforms in Iceland. In the 1990s, Iceland increased the proportion 
of individual user funding of public services, as well as the link between individual benefit 
payments and benefits. In the pension system, besides the state and company pensions, an ad-
ditional private provision was introduced and tied to tax policy incentives. The basic pension, 
which originally was independent of earnings, was adapted to individual payments. The cur-
rent pension reform partly severs the link between contributions and claims. Earnings in addi-
tion to the basic state pension have been cut: in future, earnings from employment and other 
pension funds that are above 10,000 krona will be credited against the basic pension. As in-
come increases, therefore, benefits will be cut back and from an income of four million krona 
a year completely abolished. The Icelandic measures thereby represent a deviation from the 
OECD trend, which emphasises the correlation between individual contributions and claims.   
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The consolidation package also affects the national health care system which, as in most Nor-
dic states, is largely organised by the state. Health care costs in Iceland are traditionally sig-
nificantly higher than the EU average, because the system is extensive. However, since the 
1990s there has been a move away from universal and free services in this area. Access to free 
health care has been restricted, fees introduced for all services and co-payments for drugs in-
creased (Jonsson 2001). The current health care reforms are in line with these developments: 
co-payments for medicines have been raised in order to boost demand for generic drugs, with 
a view to reducing costs by 10 per cent. Much like in the pension system, basic care is main-
tained by means of free generic drugs. However, this development could also lead to social 
division in the sense that only a few will be able to afford some special drugs.  
Besides pensions and health care costs child benefits and parental benefits have also been af-
fected by the austerity measures. While child benefit is at present paid to families with chil-
dren below six years of age regardless of income, from now on benefits will be at least partly 
income-related, with the aim of saving one billion krona. In addition, the government is cut-
ting parental benefit which has an income replacement rate of 80 per cent and at present may 
amount to a maximum 400,000 krona a month. Within the framework of the austerity package 
the highest payment is being reduced to 350,000 krona a month, so that in particular higher 
and medium incomes are affected by this measure. Parents who earn less than 437,500 krona 
(around 2,900 euros) will continue to receive 80 per cent of their income. The government es-
timates that this measure will save 70 million krona and adversely affect 15 per cent of par-
ents (30 per cent of men and 10 per cent of women). Much the same as with regard to pen-
sions and health care these reforms represent a move away from universal provisions and put 
the emphasis on means-tested payments.  
The austerity package of  Iceland‟s  Left-Green  coalition is  predominantly progressive  and 
aimed at preventing growing income inequality. The government has reduced benefits primar-
ily for those on higher incomes, while low earners remain untouched. Benefits are therefore 
reduced as income increases and pensions have been completely abolished for those with in-
comes above four million krona a year (Iceland 2009). This means that, although there has 
been a move away from non-income related benefits, minimum benefits and the living stan-
dards of those on low incomes are ensured.  
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2.5 The Romanian Austerity Programme  
The Romanian government started to implement its strict austerity plan in 2009. The budget 
envisaged an increase in social contributions of 3.3 per cent, as well as cuts in public sector 
wages and jobs. On the approval of the international loan in May 2009 Romania adopted the 
first consolidation programme. Since one year later it was evident that, despite the reforms, 
the agreed deficit target would not be reached the government passed another austerity pack-
age. This provides for deep cuts in the Romanian welfare state, with sweeping cuts of 15 per 
cent in all social transfers and of 25 per cent in public sector wages in order to bring about a 
structurally balanced budget by 2014.  
The government‟s approach is based mainly on cuts; with an increase in tax revenues not en-
visaged for the time being (see also Table 1). In order to reach its budget policy targets the 
Romanian government planned, in the first rounds of cuts, the introduction of a law on »stan-
dard pensions«, as well as a »uniform payment system«. While the latter relies on the stan-
dardisation and efficiency of public sector pay, the former concerns comprehensive pension 
reform. Pension reform is to be implemented in 2011 and is intended to reduce the budget 
deficit by up to four per cent over the long term (Stability Programme RO 2010).  
Pension reform encompasses a number of measures aimed at reducing costs over the long 
term.  To this  end the retirement age is  being raised to  65 and standardised for men and 
women; the minimum contribution period is being increased; and the assessment base is being 
extended among others to freelancers and the public sector. In addition, pensions are being 
tied to inflation, which over the long term will yield considerable savings because adjustment 
will increasingly be oriented towards consumer prices and less to increases in income. In fu-
ture, pension levels will be calculated also on the basis of total contributions and no longer on 
earnings in the final years of insurance. These measures are supposed to establish an incentive 
to remain in employment longer and more constantly. However, they will also lead to lower 
pensions, especially for those with irregular contribution records. Besides re-orientating the 
state pension system the Romanian government is set on bringing the private pension system 
to the fore. Since 2007, people have increasingly been turning to private and capital funded 
provisions. 
On 6 May 2010 Finance Minister Basescu announced the consolidation measures, justifying 
them by saying that the payment of the next IMF loan depended on them. While it is true that  
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the IMF demanded further budgetary consolidation to the value of 2.3 per cent of GDP in 
2010 there were no specific guidelines concerning the shape restructuring was supposed to 
take. Within the framework of the second austerity package, however, drastic cuts in the so-
cial budget and in the public sector are to the fore. The government resolved on wage cuts of 
25 per cent in the public sector and cuts in all social transfers of 15 per cent. While sweeping 
reductions in pensions were halted by the Constitutional Court, the other areas, such as unem-
ployment benefits and parental benefits, are affected by these deep cuts. However, the meas-
ures do not include minimum payments and thus do not protect those most in need. 
While the Romanian consolidation strategy is based on massive economies virtually no tax 
increases are planned. Although the government raised VAT from 19 per cent to 24 per cent 
in July 2010 it was an emergency measure after the planned pension cuts of 15 per cent had 
been declared unconstitutional. Apart from that no additional taxes are being levied and the 
government does not envisage redistribution by means of property and inheritance taxes or 
the taxation of gains from foreign exchange and speculation. The government‟s strict austerity 
plan thus affects, besides the public sector, in particular pensioners, families and social benefit 
recipients. However, there is no differentiation between income groups; the across-the-board 
cuts will leave those on low incomes comparatively worse off.  
The Romanian government‟s reforms represent a regressive policy approach in which high 
and stable incomes are spared. While the consolidation package affects all benefit recipients 
high-income and wealthy strata are exempted from collective responsibility for correcting the 
budget deficit. Naturally, they are affected by the VAT increase, but apart from that they do 
not really have to share the costs of the government‟s measures. Socially vulnerable groups 
therefore not just relatively but also nominally have to bear more of the burden of budget re-
structuring. The Romanian government‟s austerity plan can therefore be considered a renun-
ciation by the state of redistributive and social policy goals.  
2.6  »Welfare that works«: the British austerity programme  
The guiding principles of the Conservative-Liberal coalition‟s austerity programme are per-
sonal responsibility and freedom. The five-year plan is aimed at eliminating the structural 
deficit by 2014–15 and reducing net borrowing from 11.4 per cent to 1.1 per cent in the fiscal 
year 2015–2016. Besides introducing a banking tax and raising VAT and capital taxation, the 
government plans to reduce the debt primarily through cuts: by 2015, 77 per cent of the con- 
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solidation programme is to be achieved through spending cuts  (HM Treasury 2010). The 
budgets of almost every ministry are being cut, half a million public sector jobs are being 
eliminated, British people will have to work longer and social spending, as well as welfare 
fraud and misuse are to be reduced.  
The aim of the British welfare reforms is to heighten the responsibility of the individual and 
to reinforce the incentives to take up regular employment (subject to social insurance contri-
butions, known as »national insurance«) by way of sanctions and benefit reductions, so that 
»work always pays« (Financial Plan UK 2010). The government measures are comprehensive 
and affect pensioners, single parents, welfare benefit recipients and families. A switch from 
the retail price index to the consumer price index is to be introduced for the calculation of all 
benefits. The extent to which benefit recipients will lose out as a result of this switch is dis-
puted. Some studies show, however, that it corresponds to a reduction in benefits and will 
provide the state with savings of around 5.8 billion pounds in 2014–15 (IFS 2010).  
Besides the reorientation of pension indexation the Conservative-Liberal coalition decided to 
raise the retirement age again and to eliminate tax relief on pensions over 130,000 pounds a 
year. While the limitation of tax relief affects only higher pensions the change in indexation, 
which could be accompanied by a lowering of pensions in general, affects in particular the re-
cipients of state pensions. A characteristic feature of the British pension system is the impor-
tance of private and company pensions, since the flat-rate state pension is not enough to cover 
basic needs (Mitton 2008). Pensioners who have no other income are therefore dependent on 
other benefits. However, within the framework of the consolidation strategy complementary 
benefits, such as housing benefit and child benefit, are being cut.  
Housing benefit, which currently stands at 50 per cent of the rent, is being reduced by the coa-
lition to 30 per cent. That means that recipients of this benefit can only choose the cheapest 
housing in their area. In addition, a general maximum payment is being introduced independ-
ent of local rents, with a view to saving 4.2 billion pounds over the next five years. The gov-
ernment also plans to restructure child benefit, linking benefits more closely to need. While 
child benefit, which is not income-related, is being cut, the government is boosting child cred-
its, which are means-tested. This means that over the next few years increases in child benefit 
will be postponed and abolished for families on higher incomes from 2013. This is in line 
with the key values of the British welfare state, which traditionally emphasises benefits for 
the poorest and for children. In addition, single parents with children over five years of age  
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can no longer obtain income support but in future will have to register as unemployed: this 
measure is intended to increase employment incentives for this group. 
Besides the tax increases and welfare reforms the British government also plans to raise the 
personal tax allowance for all by 1,000 pounds. While the cuts affect benefit recipients most 
of all, those on higher incomes benefit most from this measure. The Institute for Financial 
Studies (IFS 2010) therefore describes the British austerity programme as regressive, the big-
gest losers from the Conservative-Liberal reforms being benefit recipients. In contrast, those 
without children and on higher incomes are the biggest winners since they are not affected by 
the reforms and benefit from the raising of the tax allowance. Although the austerity package 
is certainly comprehensive and means severe cuts for some groups the reforms do not repre-
sent a complete reorientation of the British welfare system, but in many respects rather the 
consolidation of the existing model.  
3.  A Comparison of the Austerity Programmes  
Table 1 summarises the findings of country studies and presents the sums involved in the 
various consolidation programmes in relation to GDP and in billions of the national currency. 
While Romania adopted a package worth almost 14 per cent of GDP, the German austerity 
programme amounts to a mere 3.3 per cent of GDP. In order to develop a solid basis for inter-
state comparison it makes sense to compare the various austerity plans in relation to annual 
GDP. Romania – with an annual consolidation effect of seven per cent of GDP – is at the top, 
followed by Greece with five per cent. In contrast, the package of the German conservative-
liberal coalition, at 0.8 per cent, lies at the bottom end, and the Spanish and Icelandic pro-
grammes are also relatively low. The magnitudes of the consolidation programmes therefore 
vary considerably.  
The differences can be traced back to, among things, the various effects of the crisis in Euro-
pean countries. While Germany‟s economic situation and the national debt appear to be re-
covering swiftly, other countries – such as Romania and Greece – have taken up international 
loans linked to strict budget plans and extensive structural reforms. In these states in particu-
lar the austerity programmes are very harsh. However, there are also differences: Iceland also 
stood on the brink of state bankruptcy when the nationalisation of the three largest banks 
greatly exceeded the national finances. Although the Icelandic government applied for bil- 
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lions in international loans annual consolidation is quite low, at 2.4 per cent. The approach of 
Prime Minister Sigurðardóttir‟s government – which envisages cuts worth 12 per cent of GDP 
– is a long-term one, over a five year period, and thus low expressed as an annual average.  
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Table 1 presents, besides the size of the consolidation package, the relationship between reve-
nue increases and spending cuts as a percentage of the respective austerity package. Accord-
                                                 
3 Even though no increase in corporate tax was introduced, the German government plans to introduce a transac-
tion tax with projected revenues of around six billion euros, corresponding to around 7.5 per cent of the austerity 
package. 
4 In Britain the personal income tax allowance was increased by £1,000 per annum, which is regressive, not pr o-
gressive in effect. 
5 Estimates for Romania are particularly difficult because of the lack of  public data and the multitude of rev i-
sions, since initial consolidation effects were not achieved. However, Romania decided, alongside an increase in 
VAT from 19 per cent to 24 per cent, only on an extension of personal income tax and consumption taxes to  
medical products. The former will, according to the finance minister, amount to around 3.5 –4 billion lei, corre-
sponding to around 0.65 per cent of GDP. Total consolidation measures for 2010 amount to 6.5 per cent of GDP, 
so that 90 per cent of the Romanian package consists of cuts and only 10 per cent can be attributed to additional 
revenues. European Commission estimates confirm this finding (EU Public Finances 2010).  
    26 
ing to our calculations all states focus predominantly on cuts in spending rather than on in-
creasing or introducing taxes or social contributions. This can be explained by the fact that the 
»economic literature shows that consolidation is more effective and more sustained by means 
of spending cuts than consolidation through tax increases«, as highlighted by the European 
Commission (EU Public Finances 2010: 51). However, given the extent of government debts 
one-sided consolidation is considered insufficient.  
Although all states are relying largely on cuts considerable differences with regard to consoli-
dation approaches can be observed. While almost half the Greek austerity programme is being 
achieved through tax revenues their proportion in the Romanian package is only one-sixth. 
These differences can be traced back, on the one hand, to variations in national circumstances 
and so to the existing scope for cuts and tax increases. On the other hand, there are also gov-
ernments that subscribe to different values
7 and have different national traditions, which cer-
tainly favour different consolidation approaches.  
The crisis and the dire state of the public finances have served in all countries both to trigger 
and to justify cuts in the  welfare state. In Germany, for example, about one-third of all con-
solidation measures involve social security reforms, while in Britain they make up one -fifth. 
In Spain, in contrast, the cuts represent only around five per cent and in Iceland about 15 per 
cent. In other words, while some countries have focused on welfare cuts, in others they have 
been far less significant. In addition, findings show that an automatic uncoordinated European 
convergence is improbable: even countries such as Britain and Romani a plan further reduc-
tions although social spending as a proportion of GDP is already below  the EU average (see 
Section 1). The data show, therefore, that also in future there is no question of an automatic 
adjustment to a social security standard, but rather that European coordination is necessary. 
Not only the proportion of welfare cuts but also the ways in which they are made differ con-
siderably. In general, either the pension or the health care system  is affected in all countries, 
in most cases both (see Table 2). In these areas certain tendencies can be observed: in pe n-
sions, besides increases in the retirement age, calculation bases are being extended and ind i-
vidual contribution equivalence is being strengthened. While most governments plan stru c-
                                                                                                                                                   
6 Without long-term structural reforms in the health care sector and pension system. 
7 Although the number of countries considered in our study is too small for a reliable conclusion,  Table 2 sug-
gests that parties still matter in politics. Albeit there appears to be no qualitative difference between various par-
tisan constellations, a quantitative difference is discernible.    
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tural reforms in pension schemes Romania originally decided to implement across-the-board 
cuts of 15 per cent and 10 per cent, respectively. Since these were struck down by the Consti-
tutional Court similar effects are to be achieved by structural reforms. It is all the more aston-
ishing that the Icelandic government passed a pension reform which bucks this trend. Pen-
sions in Iceland are to be cut back with increasing incomes and individual equivalence re-
duced.  
Besides health care systems other social spending has been affected in all countries. In health 
care, cuts have been made through price and cost caps, increasing resort to generic drugs, less 
inpatient treatment and individual co-payments. While the scope of these measures differs by 
country a move away from state benefits and towards individual co-payments and risk provi-
sion can be observed. Besides cuts in health care, benefits and services in other areas of social 
security have been scaled back. In Romania all benefits have been cut by 15 per cent; in Ger-
many parental benefits for social security recipients have been abolished; in Britain housing 
benefit has been cut; in Spain »baby cheques« have been abolished.  
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While most countries are making savings at the expense of those on low incomes, only a few 
governments are pursuing a strategy which also involves higher earners in debt consolidation. 
For example, Britain and Germany are making cuts which affect the neediest and social bene- 
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fit recipients with the aim of reducing the wage gap and boosting employment incentives. 
This represents a regressive policy, with – in effect – redistribution from low to high earners. 
However, also those programmes which plan mainly across-the-board welfare cuts such as 
those of Spain and Romania can be categorised as regressive. In contrast, Iceland has passed 
welfare cuts which predominantly affect middle and higher incomes. In addition, only a few 
countries – such as Iceland and Greece – plan to involve higher earners through taxation of 
property or wealth or through taxes on profitable companies. Although some other countries, 
such as Britain, have introduced a banking levy they have at the same time reduced corporate 
taxes, thereby diluting the redistributive component.  
Basically, the international economic crisis and the resulting public debt situation have served 
in all six countries as both trigger and justification of social spending cuts. Although their 
consolidation strategies share a number of similarities there are also considerable differences: 
on the one hand, there appear to be few countries whose approach includes a redistributive 
component and thus represents a progressive approach; on the other hand, most consolidation 
programmes – such as those of Britain and Germany – are in effect targeting those on lower 
incomes.  
4. Brief Summary  
Europe said goodbye long ago to defining social policy within the framework of a particular 
concept of society. Welfare states have given way to – historically differing – European social 
models in which social policy must follow economic and fiscal priorities. This implies both a 
declining solidarity component in social security and a financial commitment which declines 
for every successive benefit claim in pursuit of alleged incentive and allocation effects. This 
general assessment applies not only to the developed EU states of “Old Europe”, but also to 
the convergence candidates in the south and east of the EU, which have deserted the former 
development path with its higher correlation between economic development and social pro-
visions.  
The hope that the world financial crisis, with its social upheavals, could lead to a rethink and 
that the – hotly contested -- European Social Model could serve as the basis for an alternative 
approach to European integration seems vain, given the budgetary situations in almost every 
EU country. Almost everywhere, even in the wake of the global financial crisis, the orthodox  
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truths of finance policy – balanced budget within the framework of the Stability and Growth 
Pact – still apply or are formulated even more starkly. The belief that budget consolidation is 
more likely to succeed on the basis of spending cuts than revenue increases also seems un-
shakable
8.  
In all the cases investigated  – perhaps with the exception of Iceland – regressive spending 
cuts predominate, regardless of the composition of the government. Revenue increases by 
means of progressive tax rate rises at best play a subordinate role: occasionally, regressive 
VAT increases are partly offset by corporate tax increases, thereby heightening the regression. 
Even countries such as Ireland, which have to apply to the European aid programme, appear 
to have been able to avoid having to raise their competition-distorting low corporate taxes.  
Since almost everywhere in the EU regressive austerity measures of unprecedented magnitude 
have been implemented the consolidation effects are at the very least unclear: the still domi-
nant fiscal orthodoxy is built on the notion of the »crowding in« of private investment as gov-
ernment spending falls. Then the growth path can remain intact or even – with corresponding 
expectation effects – increase and consolidation succeed alongside a trimmed social state (see 
Heise 2010b: 287ff). The alternative (Keynesian) view regards as naïve the hope of a com-
pensating private »crowding in« in the event of falling consumer spending power and fears 
negative effects with regard to growth which – depending on the magnitude of the multiplier 
and accelerator effects – will at the very least hinder consolidation, if not make it impossible 
(see Heise 2010b: 287ff). The more widespread the cuts the less hope there is that deficient 
domestic demand can be compensated by external (export) demand. There is therefore a great 
deal of evidence of a stagnant growth scenario in the EU in which consolidation efforts will 
have little success and thus the pressure towards regressive measures will even increase (see 
Arestis/Pelagidis 2010).  
Considering, finally, that the EU and the European Monetary Union are characterised by in-
creasing regional imbalances which cannot be sustained over the long term (see, for example, 
Dullien 2010) the danger cannot be ignored that the pessimistic convergence prognosis will 
                                                 
8 Which is peculiar as empirical evidence produced by a recent study of the IMF clearly shows no obvious corre-
lation between the type of consolidation and the success of large fiscal adjustments: large fiscal adjustments can 
be almost entirely based on income increasing measures as in Greece between 1995 and 2001 or can be based 
almost entirely on expenditure reductions as in Belgium between 1998 and 2009. Moreover, they can also be 
based on a mixture of revenue increase and expenditure cuts as in Ireland (1989 – 2001), Sweden (1987 – 1994) 
or Denmark (1986 – 1991); see IMF (2010b).     
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become reality: if regulation at EU level does not prevent it cuts in social services as both a 
consolidation and a competitiveness strategy could become dominant. Given the diverse so-
cial models in the EU member states a harmonisation of social policy as a counter-strategy is 
not only somewhat unconvincing but also impractical. A concept which maintained national 
autonomy over social policy, while preventing both absolute and relative forms of dumping, 
however, could be accepted: this is the so-called »corridor model« (see Busch 1998; Heise 
1997: 138f). On this basis the connection between economic development and social security 
(see Figure 2a) which prevailed in the 1990s could be institutionally safeguarded by requiring 
each member state to guarantee a social spending rate in accordance with its state of devel-
opment within a defined corridor. Economic advancement of the kind achieved by, for exam-
ple, Ireland would be linked to a corresponding expansion of the welfare state – the priorities 
would remain a national matter, but relative dumping would be halted. And absolute dumping 
in crisis periods would be prevented unless the Community, on the basis of shared responsi-
bility, redefined the corridor.  
After the billions spent on rescue packages for banks and whole countries such a European 
Social Model could be considered a necessary social shield which would restrict national 
autonomy no more than the single currency and the European Stability and Growth Pact have 
long done. The social protests all over Europe serve as a reminder that an EU without social 
foundations could, in the long term, be built on sand.   
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